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In the history of economic thought the relationship between money and market has been interpreted 
from two contrasting points of view. On the one hand, money is seen as an instrument created by 
individuals to overcome the difficulties involved in barter, its basic function being as a medium of 
exchange, while the other view has it that money developed before the market and that its principal 
function is that of a standard of value. 
Evidently, therefore, in the former case the unit of account function is seen to have emerged from a 
practice (exchange of goods and services) based on the advantages to be had for individuals 
seeking to maximise their utility, while in the latter case money emerges as a rule adopted by 
members of the community (the political authorities promoting it and ensuring it be respected) 
which pre-dates the market. 
As in the case of money, also for the market two approaches have come into confrontation in the 
course of the history of economic thought. With the first the market is seen as a column bearing the 
economies characterised by private property and freedom of enterprise. It represents the means by 
which members of society democratically come to decisions about the use of resources and 
distribution of income. In the second approach, on the other hand, the market is seen as the means 
by which decisions on the use of resources and distribution of income, once taken by the groups 
enjoying economic command, are passed on to the other members of society to be implemented. In 
the first case the market lies at the heart of the system and serves to prevent the enjoyment of 
privileges and position rents by some members of society excluding others, while in the second it 
merely plays a supporting role for the existing patterns of power. 
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Two alternative conceptions of money 
 
In the history of economic thought the relationship between money and market has 
been interpreted from two contrasting points of view. On the one hand, money is seen 
as an instrument created by individuals to overcome the difficulties involved in barter, 
its basic function being as a medium of exchange, while the other view has it that 
money developed before the market and that its principal function is that of a standard 
of value. Evidently, therefore, in the former case the unit of account function is seen to 
have emerged from a practice (exchange of goods and services) based on the 
advantages to be had for individuals seeking to maximise their utility, while in the 
latter case money emerges as a rule adopted by members of the community (the 
political authorities promoting it and ensuring it be respected) which pre-dates the 
market. 
These contrasting views date back as early as the times of Aristotle, who defined 
money, alternatively, as  a commodity selected by agents to serve as a medium of 
exchange, and as a simple token created by the political authorities to be used as a 
means of payment. In his Politics (I, 1257a) he argues that money is the means created 
by agents for convenience in exchanges, and that the State intervenes only 
subsequently to facilitate measurement of the weight and assessment of the quality of 
the chosen commodity (Aristotle 1977: 38-42). In the Nicomachean Ethics (V, 5, 
1133b), on the other hand, money is seen as a legal convention – a measure of value 
that enables the exchange of goods and thus collaboration between members of the 
polis. Money is a social convention, and performs its function by dint of a decision 
made by the political authorities  (Aristotle 1982: 284-8). 
Aristotle’s two theories represent a heritage that has been drawn upon throughout the 
history of pre-modern economic thought, and it was not until the eighteenth century 
that a significant change came about. It was then, with the dawn of political economy, 
that its theoreticians (Hume, Quesnay, Smith...) levelled their critical fire at 
mercantilism as a convenient target to match themselves against.  The thesis to be 
confuted was that true wealth lay in gold and silver: for the sake of the country’s 
prosperity, therefore, it was necessary to accumulate the precious metals. Actually, this   2
was not the mercantilist idea; rather, it held that the accumulation of the precious 
metals by virtue of a positive balance of trade was but a consequence of the economic 
system’s capacity to produce wealth and generate employment. This idea was to be 
rediscovered and subjected to searching analysis by Keynes after a lapse of 150 years, 
as we shall see later on. 
The idea that it was money that represented true wealth was not hard to confute. For 
the classical economists it sufficed to observe that wealth was a composite set of useful 
things, while money was but a means to facilitate exchange. What counted was not the 
wealth and power of the State but the wellbeing of the individual members of the 
community. The criticism advanced by the classical economists had great success, in 
the space of fifty years sweeping away the mercantilist doctrine, which remained 
confined to government practices ignored by the new theory. So it was classical 
political economy described the functioning of the market economies, drastically 
downsizing the role and importance of money. 
One possible reason for this outcome is that money, like the State or income 
distribution, represented a formidable stumbling block for an economic science to be 
constructed on the model of Newtonian physics, eliciting those natural laws that 
govern the economic world. If only it were demonstrated that economic activity was 
subject to natural laws – not human, that is, and so immutable – all that governments 
could do would be to respect them and seek to remove the obstacles compromising 
their efficacy. This interpretation of the economic world offered support to the social 
groups emerging in the society of the ancien régime: entrepreneurs, bankers, ship-
owners, insurers, property-owners and capitalists and, in general, all who looked to the 
development of production and trade to promote and consolidate their own positions in 
society. Asserting the existence of natural laws to which the production (and 
distribution) of wealth was subject meant denying the legitimacy of interventionist 
government policies, while at the same time calling for extension of the autonomy and 
freedom of initiative of the private agents operating in the economic field. It also 
required that the tools employed by the political authorities to regulate the market 
economy and keep it under control, such as taxes, income distribution and money, be 
blunted and relegated to a marginal role.   3
And the classical economists accordingly concentrated their attention on the private 
sector, confining within narrow limits the scope for action by the State, limited to 
providing the essential services for the functioning of the economic system, or, in 
short, defending property. Money was to be seen as a mere medium of exchange: a 
“neutral” means that was not to interfere in the determination of prices but simply to 
ensure transparency for the “signals” they transmit to the production and consumption 
decision-makers. Like the wheel or the steam engine, money was but a technical means 
to reduce production costs: in the specific case, to guarantee that productive 
specialisation and the market prove advantageous. There is no need to invoke the 
social aspect of economic activity to account for its existence: it is enough to consider 
the exchange of goods and services between individuals pursuing self-interest, society 
being simply the sum of individuals collaborating among themselves through 
exchange. 
 
Money in history 
 
Historical evidence in support of the idea that money existed before the market is 
offered by the wergeld and the tally, two institutions that have come under the lens of 
anthropologists and historians of economics and law. ‘Wergeld’ is a term from old 
German referring to compensation for the murder of a member of the community or 
some offence against his person, family or patrimony. It is a practice we find 
documented in pre-classical Greece, and among the Celtic, Germanic, Scandinavian 
and Slav populations of the Dark Ages. Apparently the aim was to assuage the wrath of 
the injured party or his family and prevent the outbreak of feuds, seen as threatening 
the solidity of social structures. Both the offences and compensations were assessed 
through common practice, which ensured the force of a binding principle. 
It has been observed that the English verb ‘to pay’(from the French payer), referring to 
settlement of a debt, derives from the Latin pacare, which means ‘to pacify’ and refers 
to the process of seeking an agreement with the injured party to prevent his revenge. 
According to Grierson (1977: 22), geld (a term cognate with the Old English gild, 
geld) indicates a unilateral payment (a fine, a tax, compensation or a feudal due), while 
werd recalls the English ‘worth’, from the root word wair (‘man’), like the Latin vir.   4
Weorp or wairp are Old English terms indicating ‘price’, although, Grierson suggests 
(ibid.), the second of the two terms ‘may have included a more sinister element’, in 
that it referred specifically to the price of a slave. Thus the connection with the 
evaluation of goods, at first sight totally lacking, could be detected in the institution of 
slavery, much like that of the bride’s wealth. Both are attested with certainty in ancient 
Greece, as indeed in the barbarian societies of western Europe, and may have 
represented the medium by means of which the assessment of offences could be 
extended from person to patrimony, and thus to all goods of economic value. Grierson 
(ibid.) goes on to point out that in Greek poléin (‘to sell’) originally referred to the sale 
of a person as slave, while the term timé (‘price’) included in its connotation the sense 
of ‘compensation’, ‘satisfaction’ and derived from the same root as timoréin (‘to have 
revenge’). 
A further point made in this respect (Wray 1998: 49) is that, supposing that it was in 
fact wergeld that lay behind the notion of debt and the search for a measure of value, 
the decisive factor determining its introduction was probably the need to establish the 
amount of levies. It is surely significant that in Mesopotamia, where the State first 
entered the scene, the standard of value was based on the unit of weight of the most 
common cereals, wheat and barley. This standard of value, or unit of account, is money 
in its primitive state, compatible, and – as the historical documentation shows, actually 
associated – with a wide range of objects serving as means of payment. A significant 
example is offered by the tally. 
According to certain scholars (Innes 1913: 394 and 396; Davies 1994: 147-52), for 
many centuries the major means of payment in Europe was the tally, a stick of squared 
hazel-wood with notches cut into it to indicate how much the debt came to. The name 
of the debtor and date of the contract were written on either side of the stick, which 
was then cut in two lengthwise, thus splitting the notches into two parts, each with the 
name of the debtor and date of the contract. The cut in the stick stopped about an inch 
short of the end;  the longer part, called the stock, was held by the creditor, while the 
shorter, called the stub, was left to the debtor. On payment the two parts of the stick 
were brought back together to verify the effective sum of the debt. In England the tally 
became increasingly important as from the twelfth century, to peak in the period 
preceding the foundation of the Bank of England. This momentous event did not put an   5
end to use of the tally, which continued for over a century up to its termination in 1834. 
The factors behind the spread of the tally were the ban on usury and the scarcity of 
currency. In the course of time the tally became a wooden bill by means of which it 
was possible not only to obtain credit harmless of the penalties laid down by the law, 
but also to settle any debts and acquire commodities of all sorts (Innes 1913: 396). It 
was rapidly adopted by the Treasury. The first step consisted in the assignment with 
which the Exchequer transferred the taxpayers’ debt to the sovereign’s creditors, 
handing over the stock. Next came the tallia dividenda, which were consigned to the 
court suppliers, and refunded on expiration by the Exchequer like modern-day state 
bonds. Finally, at a later stage the tallies were issued in great quantities by the Treasury 
as advances on fiscal revenue, and holders could trade them for money on the market. 
Thus, as Davies points out (1994: 150), ‘a system of discounting tallies arose 
especially in London, operated in a number of recorded instances by officials working 
in the Exchequer’. 
A function much like that of the tally was, according to Innes (1913: 395-6), served in 
Babylonia by clay tablets called shubati (‘receipt’) on which were recorded the 
quantity of goods sold – wheat, for example – the name of the issuer and that of the 
recipient, together with his seal and the name shubati. There were two ways to prevent 
counterfeiting: either the tablets could be deposited in a temple, or they could be sealed 
in a closed container that had to be broken like a money box to get at the tablets. In the 
latter case all the details recorded on the tablets were copied onto the container, except 
for the recipient’s name and seal. The container was broken only when payment was 
carried out, and the inscriptions could thus be compared. Unlike the tablets deposited 
in the temples, those sealed in containers could circulate like the tallies. 
What the tallies and shubati tablets have in common is that they both certificated debts 
and served as means of payment, disappearing from circulation once the credit was 
offset by a debt of the same amount, as was the practice with letters of exchange in the 
medieval fairs. Some scholars argue that these records could not be considered money 
since the settlement of any remaining debt was, once compensation had been 
performed, probably concluded with money proper, or in other words minted gold and 
silver. Others point out that the shubati tablets were documented in Babylonia  at least 
2500 years before the kings of Lydia minted the fist metal coins around the second half   6
of the seventh century BC. On the other hand, the metal currency that we are 
accustomed to consider real money seems to have come into existence as certification 
of the sovereign’s debt to the subjects whose goods and services he acquired – 
mercenary soldiers, for example, or suppliers liable to pay taxes (Grierson 1977: 10). It 
was no great problem for the political authorities to have their promises of payment  
accepted in exchange for goods and services since they were able to levy taxes and 
stated their readiness to accept their own promissory notes in payment.  The use of 
costly supports such as gold and silver, which were rare metals and, in the absence of 
mines, usually came with war booties, is generally explained as a way of avoiding 
forgeries. 
Supposing that the function of a means of payment was served from the very outset not 
by a commodity but by a certificate of debt issued by an agent enjoying the confidence 
of the public, then the introduction of money seems obviously not due so much to the 
agents’ intention to reduce the costs of exchanges as to the fact that the issuer claims 
credit of the community and so is able to levy taxes. Thus money takes the form of an 
institution transcending the purely economic sphere in that it guarantees the exchange 
of goods and services between governors and governed, and with it the very 
foundations of social order. Like every other institution, this, too, owes its existence to 
the decision of the groups holding power to establish it, and the ability of those 
representing these groups to exact the respect of the entire community. 
 
Two alternative views of market 
 
As in the case of money, also for the market two approaches have come into 
confrontation in the course of the history of economic thought. With the first the 
market is seen as a column bearing the economies characterised by private property 
and freedom of enterprise. It represents the means by which members of society 
democratically come to decisions about the use of resources and distribution of 
income. Thanks to the market, in fact, all individuals, whatever their role, wealth or 
education, engage in the decision-making process on an equal footing with all the 
others. In the second approach, on the other hand, the market is seen as the means by 
which decisions on the use of resources and distribution of income, once taken by the   7
groups enjoying economic command, are passed on to the other members of society to 
be implemented. In the first case the market lies at the heart of the system and serves to 
prevent the enjoyment of privileges and position rents by some members of society 
excluding others, while in the second it merely plays a supporting role for the existing 
patterns of power. 
What does, however, distinguish a market economy? In centrally managed economic 
systems like the “hydraulic” economies of Mesopotamia  and ancient Egypt (Wittfogel 
1959), the European feudal system or the planned economy of the former Soviet 
Union, those in charge of the economy exercise their decision-making powers 
regarding the channelling of resources and distribution of income giving direct orders 
to those working under them. In the market economy, by contrast, in order to exercise 
their power the figures in charge of the economy make use of indirect orders, which 
take the form of contracts: thus it is not immediately evident that real orders are being 
given. While we cannot but recognise the fact that any exchange presupposes the 
existence of needs that cannot be satisfied autonomously by those involved, we must 
also bear in mind that not all parties share the same degree of urgency; thus 
dependence on the counterparty is greater for some than for others.  The most 
significant exchanges that take place in a market economy, like the buying and selling 
of work services, consumption goods or securities, are characterised by a distinct 
difference in the power of the two parties. Here the term ‘power’ is understood as a 
relationship between two social agents when there is conflict in their aims or values, or 
on the line to follow to achieve them. One of the two agents accedes to the other’s 
demands for fear that he may deprive him of one or more values which he holds dearer 
than those he is to sacrifice. In other words, power always goes hand in hand with a 
sanction, and involves a degree of rationality since the agent exercising it looks to the 
counterparty’s capacity to weigh up his own advantage. 
It is in the exercise of power that we find the key to the functioning of market 
economies. As we are reminded by Marglin (1974: 51-3), at the time of the industrial 
revolution entrepreneurs were able to get the workers into their factories only by facing 
them with the choice of working or starving. Discharged soldiers, peasants driven from 
their villages with the enclosure of common land, orphaned minors placed in the 
charge of the parishes for periods of even ten or more years, wives and children of   8
home-based workers sent to the factories by their respective husbands and fathers to 
eke out the family income, and ‘the scum of every class and of every occupation’ 
(Mantoux 1961: 375) – such was the human material that composed the first generation 
of factory workers.  The process was repeated in the course of capitalistic 
development, to the point that wage labour became a ‘natural’ fact that had no need of 
explanation. 
What we witness here is the quest for positions of power by economic agents on the 
strength of which they can bend the behaviour of other agents to their purposes. If we 
see it in these terms, we can appreciate the concern of the early critics of the market, 
who contested the vaunted capacity of the system to guarantee equality for the 
members of society, keeping the privileges and inequalities that had characterised the 
society of the ancien régime from setting in once again. The exponents of political 
economy answered back with the metaphor of the “invisible hand”, an ideal mechanism 
situated outside time that was entrusted with the task of guaranteeing freedom of 
access to economic activity in all its forms, together with efficiency in the use of 
resources and fairness in the distribution of income. The mechanism was to be descried 
in the market price system and the free play of forces in competition; acceptance of this 
interpretative scheme has long been - and indeed remains - a dominant feature of 
economic reasoning. 
 
The power structure of the economy 
 
The alternative conception that sees in the market a social institution historically 
determined, like money, property or the State, derives from the idea that every 
economic system rests on a clearly defined power structure that assigns to certain 
individuals the authority to decide on the use of resources and the allocation of the 
final product. With its assumed price equilibrating mechanism, the market loses its 
central position to take on a more modest role as technical means to facilitate the 
exercise of power by those in control of the economy. Productive efficiency and 
distributive equity prove illusory, and with them evaporates the theoretical importance 
attached to the quest for positions of equilibrium.   9
It is in fact the theory of effective demand formulated by Keynes (and Kalecki) that 
offers this alternative. The demand for goods and services expressed by the community 
contains active and passive components, or in other words some elements (active) that 
determine others (passive), but are not in turn determined by them: in the industrial 
economies the investments made by firms are the active component of global demand, 
while family consumption constitutes the passive part. In this new scheme the market 
is merely the means employed by firms (or the social groups that have some interest or 
other in their success) to achieve the end of unlimited accumulation of wealth. In a 
capitalistic system firms advance the liquid assets obtained from the banks, hire the 
workers, use their services to produce gods, and subsequently sell their consumption 
goods and stock in order to regain possession of the money they advanced, keeping for 
themselves part of the capital goods after paying the banks their interest. 
As had already been pointed out by Marx, in a system of this type the economic 
process can be summed up with the sequence: D – M – D’, where M, which stands for 
the goods, and thus for the market, performs an instrumental role with respect to D, 
money, which constitutes the condition and objective of the entire process. Keynes 
takes explicit reference from this scheme when he introduces the distinction between 
‘cooperative economy’  and ‘entrepreneur economy’  (1979: 81). The former is purely 
conjectural and constitutes the object of study in traditional theory, while the latter, 
which actually exists, is to be examined with a new approach which he terms 
‘monetary theory of production’ (1979: 49-50). 
 
This is the picture of the market that emerged in sharp definition subsequent to 
contributions by Keynes, Kalecki and economists following in their wake, but its 
origins are quite remote, going back at least to Cantillon, who described the pre-
industrial economy of the ancien régime as consisting of two classes: the landowners 
(the independent class) on one side, and the entrepreneurs and wage workers (the 
dependent class), on the other. The property owners’ spending on luxury goods 
constitutes the active component of the global demand, upon which depends the 
necessary consumption of the dependent class. Since the entrepreneurs produce only 
what they believe they can sell at a remunerative price, the market assumes the form of 
a means used by the property owners to transmit to the producers the decisions to be   10
taken on the utilization of resources. Distribution of the final product between rents 
and wages is also decided by the market on the basis of the power relations between 
property owners and the dependent class. Obviously, this is a sui generis market 
picture in which the property owners’ wishes are law, since - as he points out -  if they 
‘close their Estates and will not suffer them to be cultivated, it is clear that there would 
be neither Food nor Rayment for any of the Inhabitants’ (Cantillon 1964: 43; see also 
Giacomin 1994). 
Thus Cantillon, like Keynes and Kalecki, held that the position of a social group in 
command over others rests on the possibility it has to abstain from spending its income 
for a period of time long enough to condition the existence of the others. However, we 
must also bear in mind that a significant change occurred in transition from pre-
industrial to advanced industrial economy. The land owners departed from the scene, 
and the banks set up in their place. It is the banks that control access to resources for 
the producers. The rents taken by the landowners of the ancien régime are now 
represented by the interest obtained by the banks on the financing of enterprises. The 
task has passed to them to determine with their investments the directions resources are 
to take and the intensity of their use. The amount of the investments determines the 
demand for labour and, subsequently, the supply of goods and services. All that 
remains for the workers to do is to adjust their spending on consumption goods and 
stock to the income available in observance of their budget constraint. The markets that 
see bargaining engaged in for the granting of credit, the hiring of manpower and the 
sale of consumption goods and stock show on the supply side a non-competitive 
structure ranging from oligopoly, concentrated or differentiated, through more or less 
disguised forms of collusion to out-and-out monopoly. 
According to the metaphor of the invisible hand attributed to Adam Smith
1 and 
embraced in the scheme of general economic equilibrium, through the market 
individuals guided purely by self-interest are driven unwittingly and willy-nilly to 
achieve ends of general interest such as equal access to roles, efficient use of resources 
and  fair distribution of product. 
According to the alternative view, on the other hand, the market is a social institution 
that reflects the particular needs of each system and is to be understood in the light of a 
pattern of power that assigns economic dominance to one or more groups of agents   11
with the exclusion of others. The pattern emerges transparently from the hierarchy 
formed among the components of global demand. The fact that the enterprise 
investments play an active role in a capitalistic system while family consumption is left 
with a passive role is neither a matter of chance nor arbitrary. Rather, it is the natural 
consequence on the economic plane of a supremacy sanctioned at the institutional level 
through the right to property, freedom of economic enterprise and the state’s abstention 
from direct management of productive activities. With the support of the banks, it is 
the enterprises that control access to resources, including labour, since there is a vast 
supply of people compelled to sell their personal services to earn a living, and 
compelled to accept the conditions laid down by the enterprises with regard to income 
distribution. In other words, wages have to be set at a level that leaves room for the 
enterprises to make profits, whatever the workers’ needs may be. 
On the other hand, the conception of the market as a mechanism bending the action of 
individuals to the pursuit of aims of general interest leaves economic facts devoid of 
explanatory power, renders superfluous the analysis of effective demand as an element 





1 The attribution of this theory to Smith has been hotly contested by authoritative 
scholars (cf., e.g. Rothschild 1994 and Roncaglia 2005), who see in it an attempt 
lacking any textual support to enlist the father of economic science among the upholders 
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